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Abstract (Structured) 23 
Background 24 
This paper describes the development of a theoretical framework for the study of cognitive 25 
dissonance in food and nutrition.  26 
Scope and Approach 27 
The Food Cognition Dissonance (FCD) conceptual framework integrates relevant principles 28 
of cognitive dissonance and attitude, in the context of food and nutrition, to provide a novel 29 
perspective of structural food-related cognitive dissonance in relation to the examination of 30 
food-related attitudes. The elements and mechanisms within the FCD framework are 31 
elaborated, and considerations in the use of the framework are discussed.  32 
Key Findings and Conclusion  33 
The FCD framework can be applied to predicting how dissonance-based, food-related attitude 34 
change occurs. The approach may stimulate research that will ultimately lead to the 35 
development of effective nutrition programmes and/or communications to promote healthy 36 
eating.  37 
 38 
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Introduction 42 
 It has been generally recognized by researchers concerned with optimising healthy 43 
food choices that changes in dietary behaviours might occur through influencing and/or 44 
altering food related attitudes (Aikman, Crites & Fabrigar, 2006; Contento, 2012; Nestle, 45 
Wing, Birch, DiSogra, Drewnowski, Middleton, Sigman-Grant, Sobal, Winston & Economos, 46 
1998; Worsley, 2002). A theory frequently implicated in the study of attitude change is the 47 
theory of cognitive dissonance (Festinger, 1957; Harmon-Jones & Harmon Jones, 2007). Its 48 
main tenet states that individuals experience a psychological state of discomfort (i.e., 49 
cognitive dissonance) when faced with inconsistencies between two or more held cognitions. 50 
They then seek to reduce the dissonance experienced by altering one or more of the 51 
inconsistent cognitions, typically those least resistant to change (Harmon-Jones, 2002). 52 
Cognition may be broadly defined as any belief, opinion, attitude, perception, or knowledge 53 
about persons, objects, issues, and so forth (Aronson, 2004; Littlejohn & Foss, 2005; O’Keefe, 54 
2002).  55 
Despite the recognition given to the potential application of cognitive dissonance in 56 
influencing healthy dietary choices (e.g., Hamilton-Ekeke & Thomas, 2011; Hjelmar, 2011; 57 
Worsley, 2002), the closest the construct has been specifically applied to modifying some 58 
semblance of food-related behaviour hitherto would be with respect to the clinical behaviours 59 
of alcohol consumption (e.g., Hammons, 2010) and disordered eating (e.g., Rohde, Auslander, 60 
Shaw, Raineri, Gau & Stice, 2014). To date, the theory has generally not been applied to 61 
modifying non-clinical dietary health behaviour (Freijy & Kothe, 2013). In a review of 62 
cognitive dissonance research in food and nutrition, Ong, Frewer and Chan (in press) 1 63 
                                                          
1 The review was conducted from 1st Mar 2014 to 1st Oct 2014 and thus, covers all related published work up to 
1st Oct 2014. From that time to 18th Aug 2016, four more relevant food-related cognitive dissonance studies 
were found by the authors – two related to food risk/safety (Cao, Just, Turvey & Wansink, 2015; Gaspar, Luis, 
Seibt, Lima, Marcu, Rutsaert, Flectcher, Verbeke & Barnett, 2016) and two related to meat consumption 
(Onwezen & ven der Weele, 2016; Tian, Hilton & Becker, 2016). These four new studies were perused and 
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described in detail, and critically evaluated, 14 diverse food-related studies that had examined 64 
cognitive dissonance as a focal construct; they found that the 14 reviewed studies rarely 65 
pertained to examining the utility of cognitive dissonance in influencing or altering food 66 
and/or food-related attitudes, with the exception of perhaps one study that had simply 67 
investigated the effects of cognitive dissonance on the combined health behaviours of 68 
physical exercise and dietary intentions (Stellefson, Wang & Klein, 2006). Furthermore, 69 
across those studies, the authors found (1) disparities in how cognitive dissonance was used 70 
in research conceptualization, (2) variations in how cognitive dissonance arousal was 71 
experimentally evoked without clear adherence to established cognitive dissonance 72 
paradigms, and (3) the general lack of explicit measurement of cognitive dissonance itself 73 
(subsequent to its arousal). The authors suggested that the unsystematic and disconnected 74 
approach taken in the examination of cognitive dissonance in food-related studies could have 75 
resulted in inconsistent findings vis-à-vis the effects of cognitive dissonance across those 76 
studies. It was concluded that a conceptual framework integrating the basic principles of 77 
cognitive dissonance theory with the relevant attitude and context-specific theorizations 78 
associated with food and nutrition was required to facilitate systematic research in this area as 79 
a precursor to application. The purpose of this paper is to propose such an integrated 80 
theoretical framework. 81 
Developing an Integrated Conceptual Framework for the Study of Cognitive 82 
Dissonance in Food and Nutrition – Insights from Cognitive Dissonance, Attitude and 83 
Food-related Research 84 
The primary core of the proposed conceptual framework for the study of cognitive 85 
dissonance in food and nutrition should rightly be founded on the construct of cognitive 86 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
found not to affect the conclusions that were drawn from our earlier review upon which the current paper is 
based. 
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dissonance and its conceptualization. In this instance, the proposed framework adopts the 87 
basic principle underlying cognitive dissonance theory as a consistency theory of attitude 88 
change in assuming the importance of cognitive consistency maintenance2. The proposed 89 
framework primarily seeks to expound on the dissonance arousal process that is potentially 90 
invoked when individuals experience conflicting food-related cognitions. In the current 91 
context of the proposed framework, a more precise definition of cognition as attitude3 is 92 
taken as its secondary core, given the proposed framework’s ultimate application as a tool to 93 
inform and guide efforts in influencing attitude change via cognitive dissonance. The focus of 94 
the framework on the dissonance arousal process is predicated on the premise that its 95 
understanding will provide the context for a more precise prediction of the dissonance 96 
resolution process that follows (Ong et al., in press), which includes attitude change. The 97 
constructs and workings of the proposed framework will be elaborated and developed based 98 
on insights drawn from relevant research and literature related to cognitive dissonance, 99 
attitude, and food choice. 100 
The cognitive dissonance construct and the basic cognitive dissonance process 101 
Although “Festinger’s early explanation of dissonance did not clearly identify 102 
whether dissonance is cognitive or emotional” (Sweeney, Hausknecht & Soutar, 2000, p. 103 
373), dissonance theorists generally agree that both cognitive as well as affective aspects to 104 
cognitive dissonance exist. In the original version of cognitive dissonance theory, Festinger 105 
(1957) emphasized the importance of, and need for, cognitive consistency by individuals, 106 
stating that “x and y are dissonant if not-x follows from y” (p. 13), with x and y being “any 107 
                                                          
2 Although there were attempted reformulations of the precise mechanisms underlying cognitive dissonance 
effects, particularly that which related to ego-defence (e.g., Aronson, 1968; Steele & Liu, 1983; Cooper & Fazio, 
1984; Stone & Cooper, 2001), purist dissonance theorists maintain that Festinger’s (1957) original version 
focusing on cognitive consistency maintenance continues to be viable, and can explain the evidence generated 
by the revisions (Gawronski, 2012; Harmon-Jones, 2002; Harmon-Jones & Mills, 1999). 
3 Food-related attitude in the proposed framework includes attitude towards food (e.g., attitude towards pasta, 
broccoli, etc.) and attitude towards food activity/event (e.g., attitude towards dieting, sensory eating, etc.). 
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knowledge, opinion, or belief about the environment, about oneself, or about one’s 108 
behaviour” (p. 3). This essentially specifies a cognitive dimension to the cognitive dissonance 109 
construct. Cognitive consistency is defined by the logical links between cognitive elements, 110 
and the explicit nature of bringing specific cognitive elements into conscious evaluation 111 
“implies that these elements have to be understood as propositions about states of affairs that 112 
are regarded as true or false by the individual” (Gawronski, 2012, p. 653, citing Gawronski & 113 
Strack, 2004). Thus, an individual who holds, and is simultaneously aware of, the 114 
propositions “Margarine is healthier than butter” and “Margarine has been found to contain 115 
harmful trans fat” is facing a situation of cognitive inconsistency. A situation of cognitive 116 
inconsistency would evoke a psychological state of tension or discomfort (Carlsmith & 117 
Aronson, 1963; Elliot & Devine, 1994) within the individual, and it is this psychological 118 
discomfort that motivates individuals to change attitudes (Metin & Metin-Camgoz, 2011) as a 119 
means of resolving cognitive inconsistency. This psychological state of tension or discomfort 120 
represents the affective dimension of the cognitive dissonance construct, and has been 121 
referred to as an aversive motivational state (Harmon-Jones, 2002).  122 
Thus, a conceptualization of cognitive dissonance must take into account both its 123 
cognitive and affective aspects (Sweeney et al., 2000; Harmon-Jones, 2002). Harmon-Jones 124 
(2002) provided a taxonomy to distinguish the affective motivational state (i.e., dissonance) 125 
from the cognitive inconsistency that produces it (i.e., cognitive discrepancy), and the 126 
cognitive and behavioural changes that result from the affective motivational state of 127 
dissonance (i.e., cognitive discrepancy reduction). Based partially on such taxonomy, a figure 128 
to clarify the basic cognitive dissonance process is presented in Figure 1. 129 
 130 
  
Insert Figure 1 here 
 
 
 131 
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From Figure 1, it may be seen that dissonance arousal is a crucial phase in the 132 
cognitive dissonance process, as it forms the basis of the dissonance resolution phase that 133 
follows. From Festinger’s (1957) seminal introduction of the theory of cognitive dissonance 134 
to subsequent research conducted to test the theory (e.g., Brehm, 1956; Festinger & Carlsmith, 135 
1959; Festinger, Riecken & Schachter, 1956; Aronson, Fried & Stone, 1991; Aronson & 136 
Mills, 1959), various experimental paradigms dictating the conditions under which cognitive 137 
inconsistency would lead to cognitive dissonance have been derived. These are known as 138 
cognitive dissonance paradigms (Harmon-Jones & Harmon-Jones, 2002; 2007), of which the 139 
major ones include: 140 
 Free choice paradigm: When a decision is freely made by an individual, 141 
especially one that involves cognitive inconsistency, dissonance may be aroused. 142 
 Induced compliance paradigm: When an individual does or says something that 143 
contradicts a prior belief or attitude, dissonance is aroused. 144 
 Belief disconfirmation paradigm: When an individual is exposed to information 145 
inconsistent with his/her beliefs, dissonance is aroused. 146 
 Hypocrisy paradigm: Whenever an individual is induced to publicly make 147 
statements consistent with some normative standards and thereafter, reminded of 148 
times when he/she did not act in accordance with such standards as depicted in 149 
the statements made, dissonance is aroused. 150 
 Effort justification paradigm: Whenever an individual voluntarily engages (i.e., 151 
put in effort) in an unpleasant activity to achieve some goal, therein implying the 152 
occurrence of cognitive inconsistency, dissonance is aroused. 153 
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Having evolved from studies with varied contexts, the different paradigms reflect different 154 
conditions under which dissonance arousal would occur. It may be inferred, therefore, that 155 
the paradigms are amenable to differential applications, depending on the context of a study – 156 
for example, the induced compliance paradigm has been used as the basis for a dissonance-157 
based intervention for the prevention of eating disorder (e.g., Stice, Rohde, Durant & Shaw, 158 
2012) and the hypocrisy paradigm has been employed to influence various health behaviours 159 
(e.g., Freijy & Kothe, 2013). Although the paradigms are typically applied independently, it 160 
is not uncommon for the paradigms to be used in combination with one another where 161 
appropriate – for instance, Cao, Just and Wansink (2014) employed a mix of the free choice 162 
and belief disconfirmation paradigms in their experimental research looking into cognitive 163 
dissonance and confirmatory bias in relation to food risk/safety. Regardless of whether they 164 
are applied independently or in combination, however, cognitive dissonance paradigms 165 
should constitute an indispensable part of any cognitive dissonance centric study. 166 
In summary, any study that looks at cognitive dissonance would need to consider the 167 
use of specific cognitive dissonance paradigm(s) to elicit cognitive dissonance arousal. The 168 
actual arousal itself needs to be assessed in terms of its cognitive discrepancy and dissonance 169 
make-up before any subsequent motivated efforts at cognitive discrepancy reduction may be 170 
accurately attributed to the dissonance (Elliot & Devine, 1994). Current food-related studies 171 
that have examined cognitive dissonance as a focal construct, have largely neglected the 172 
cognitive dissonance arousal process such that neither the exact cognitive dissonance 173 
paradigm(s) used (if any) to elicit cognitive dissonance arousal was accurately specified nor 174 
the actual cognitive dissonance arousal explicitly measured thereafter (Ong et al. in press). 175 
The latter, in particular, has been quantitatively and qualitatively limited in cognitive 176 
dissonance research generally across domains (Sweeney et al., 2000).  177 
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Correspondingly, in additional recognition of the importance of assessing actual 178 
cognitive dissonance arousal after it has been triggered, the cognitive and affective 179 
distinctions underlying the conceptualization of the cognitive dissonance construct will be 180 
reflected within the proposed framework as food-related cognitive discrepancy (i.e., 181 
inconsistency between two or more food-related attitudes) and food-related dissonance (i.e., 182 
psychological tension/discomfort experienced as a result of food-related cognitive 183 
discrepancy) respectively. These two together define food-related cognitive dissonance. 184 
Attitude, attitudinal structures and cognitive dissonance 185 
An attitude may be defined as a psychological, evaluative response towards a 186 
particular person, place, thing, event, etc. (attitude object) in positive and/or negative terms 187 
based on affective, behavioural and cognitive information (Eagly & Chaiken, 1995; Minami, 188 
2009; Schwartz, 2012; Schwarz & Bohner, 2001). This definition of attitude adopted by the 189 
proposed framework is founded on a contemporary view of the tripartite model of attitude 190 
(Breckler, 1984; see Figure 2). 191 
 192 
  
Insert Figure 2 here 
 
 
 193 
In this model, attitude is seen as a response to an antecedent stimulus or attitude object 194 
alongside affective, behavioural and cognitive tendencies toward the attitude object. In this 195 
instance, affect essentially refers to an emotional response to an attitude object, which may be 196 
measured physiologically (e.g., heart rate, galvanic skin response) or through self-reports of 197 
feelings or mood. Behaviour includes overt actions and behavioural intentions, which may be 198 
similarly gauged via verbal, self-statements regarding behaviour. Lastly, beliefs, knowledge 199 
structures, perceptual responses, and thoughts make up the cognitive component that likewise 200 
could be assessed through verbal self-reports. In the traditional view of the model, all three 201 
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components are seen as constituents of the “anatomy” of an attitude (Smith, 1947, p.508). In 202 
the contemporary view of the model, however, the three components are seen as bases of an 203 
attitude (Fabrigar, MacDonald & Wegener, 2005). Whilst all three components, varying on a 204 
common evaluative continuum, may be sufficiently distinct from each other to preclude high 205 
inter-componential correlation, there is normally some degree of positive correlation amongst 206 
the three components that establishes a situation of triadic consistency. This is particularly so 207 
when attitude measurement may be derived from cognitive representations of each 208 
component, a provision allowed for in the tripartite model. This fits in well with the focus of 209 
cognitive dissonance theory on cognitive consistency, and its propositional-thoughts-based 210 
analysis. Thus, although the moderate inter-correlation amongst the components means that it 211 
is plausible for them to operate in partial, or even complete independence (Breckler, 1984; 212 
Greenwald, 1982, and Zajonc, 1980), the proposed framework will appeal to the tripartite 213 
model’s allowance for an assumption of tendency towards triadic consistency amongst the 214 
attitudinal components in alignment with the assumptions underlying its central cognitive 215 
dissonance core.  216 
The definition of attitude premised on the tripartite model essentially captures what 217 
has been termed as the internal structure of attitude, i.e., intra-attitudinal structure, which 218 
comprises attitude, with its tri-componential cognitive, affective, and behavioural dimensions, 219 
towards an attitude object (Fabrigar & Wegener, 2010). Attitude objects may be delineated in 220 
terms of relative concreteness or abstraction (Eagly & Chaiken, 1998), in which a less 221 
concrete (and thus, more abstract) object may be termed a superordinate attitude object, and a 222 
more concrete (and thus, less abstract) object termed a subordinate attitude object. In this 223 
case, it is possible for attitudes toward superordinate attitude objects to subsume attitudes 224 
toward subordinate attitude objects in a way that is generally consistent with each other. For 225 
example, an individual who holds a positive attitude towards environmentalism is also likely 226 
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to possess a positive attitude towards organic food (e.g., Nordvall, 2014) and a negative 227 
attitude towards meat consumption (e.g., Hjelmar, 2011). Such linkages or associations 228 
between attitudes constitute what has been termed as the external structure of attitude, i.e., 229 
inter-attitudinal structure (Fabrigar & Wegener, 2010; Dreezens, Martijin, Tenbuilt, Kok & 230 
de Vries, 2005a; 2005b; Eagly & Chaiken, 1998), which may also include attitudinal links 231 
between subordinate-subordinate and superordinate-superordinate attitude object pairings.  232 
Evidence from food and/or food-related research suggests that instances of food-233 
related cognitive dissonance may occur within and/or across attitude structures. In terms of 234 
the internal attitude structure, for instance, in a food risk/safety study, Cao, Just and Wansink 235 
(2014) reported that individuals who had committed to, and placed purchase bids for, a 236 
specific type of chocolate, demonstrated a willingness to increase their bids for the chocolate 237 
despite being given food risk information about the chocolate after they had placed their 238 
initial bids. The authors reasoned that confirmatory bias via selective information processing 239 
was engaged to narrow the discrepancy between what the individuals knew about the 240 
chocolate from the new food risk information given, and their prior behaviour of having 241 
placed purchase bids for the chocolate. Evidence for a similar occurrence of cognitive 242 
discrepancy amongst the evaluative tri-components of an attitude (typically between the 243 
behavioural and cognitive components) have been found in expectancy-disconfirmation 244 
studies in food-related consumer research (e.g., Olson & Dover, 1979), and nutrition 245 
communication research (e.g., Albarracín, Cohen & Kumkale, 2003). Separately, food-related 246 
research in attitudinal ambivalence, which may be defined as the simultaneous possession of 247 
both positive and negative evaluations of an object (Riketta, 2000; Thompson, Zanna & 248 
Griffin, 1995), provide further evidence for incongruity at the intra-attitudinal level (e.g., 249 
Berndsen & van der Pligt, 2004; Cong, Olsen & Tuu, 2013; Povey, Wellens & Conner, 2001). 250 
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In the analysis of the external attitude structure, it is important to first understand the 251 
potential link between attitude and value, particularly since individuals are hypothesized to 252 
appeal to values in a personal food system when making food choice decisions (Connors, 253 
Bisogni, Sobal & Devine, 2001; Falk, Bisogni & Sobal, 1996; Furst, Connors, Bisogni & 254 
Falk, 1996), ceteris paribus. It has been postulated that attitudes derive from values 255 
(Dreezens et al., 2005a; 2005b; Eagly & Chaiken, 1995; Verplanken & Holland, 2002), 256 
which (1) often comprise central/core, affect-laden beliefs embodying abstract 257 
ideals/principles that provide general orientation and organization for life (Austin & 258 
Vancouver, 1996; Maio, Olson, Bernard & Luke, 2003; Rohan, 2000; Rokeach, 1968; 1973; 259 
Schwartz, 2012), (2) may be global or domain-specific, and (3) are measured in terms of 260 
perceived importance to the individual (Schwartz, 1992; 2012). Values may be considered 261 
part of an extended intra-attitudinal structure where they place hierarchically above attitude, 262 
such that causality runs from values through attitudes to behaviour (Dreezens et al., 2005a; 263 
Bernard, Maio, & Olson, 2003; Homer & Kahle, 1988; Luzar & Cosse, 1998; Maio & Olson, 264 
1994; Stienstra, Ruelle, & Bartels, 2002; Thøgersen & Ölander, 2002). By serving as 265 
standards or archetypes for attitude development (Homer & Kahle, 1988; Luzar & Cosse, 266 
1998; Rokeach, 1973), values have implications for attitudinal consistency insofar as 267 
qualitative similarities and differences amongst the values exist.  268 
To elaborate, linkages between attitudes may be formed on diverse bases but typically 269 
involve links between attitudes toward different entities4 (Eagly & Chaiken, 1995; 1998). In 270 
the context of an extended intra-attitudinal structure, these may be conceptualized in terms of 271 
associations between attitudes toward different but related attitude objects stemming from (a) 272 
the same value(s), and/or (b) different values. All things being equal, it is in the latter 273 
                                                          
4 Some researchers consider multiple attitudes toward the same object (that stem from different values) as inter-
attitudinal structure since these are evaluations based on many specific (and different) attributes or emotions 
associated with the attitude object – each evaluation technically considered as an attitude based on a specific 
attribute and/or emotion (Fabrigar & Wegener, 2010; Fabrigar et al., 2005). 
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instance that inconsistencies in food-related attitudes are likely, and indeed, have been found, 274 
to occur5. For example, researchers have found that in making food choices, consumers are 275 
frequently caught in a trade-off of opposing values such as cost versus quality, or taste versus 276 
health considerations (Connors et al., 2001; Hauser, Jonas & Riemann, 2011; Shepherd, 277 
1999). The corresponding affect-based belief(s) underlying values also become conflicted, as 278 
illustrated, for example, in studies related to meat consumption and/or vegetarianism where 279 
beliefs pertaining to the values of health, taste/hedonism and universalism clash. This often 280 
translates to cognitive incongruence at the attitude level either between same- (i.e., 281 
superordinate-superordinate or subordinate-subordinate) or different-level (i.e., 282 
superordinate-subordinate) attitude object pairings (e.g., Berndsen & van der Pligt, 2004; Lea 283 
& Worsley, 2002; Rothgerber, 2014).  284 
To summarise, evidence from food-related research indicates that food-related 285 
cognitive dissonance may occur intra-attitudinally and inter-attitudinally. The evidence 286 
suggests that an alternative perspective to analysing cognitive dissonance, not yet formally 287 
recognized in cognitive dissonance research generally, much less its study in the domain of 288 
food and nutrition, is needed. The proposed framework will ensure that this evidence-based, 289 
alternative structural view of food-related cognitive dissonance is addressed. 290 
The Food Cognition Dissonance (FCD) Conceptual Framework 291 
 Integrating the insights gathered from cognitive dissonance and attitude studies both 292 
generally as well as specifically in a food-related context, the proposed theoretical framework 293 
for the study of cognitive dissonance in food and nutrition – the food cognition dissonance 294 
(FCD) conceptual framework – is presented and illustrated in Figure 3.  295 
 296 
   
                                                          
5 This pertains particularly to instances of disparate and incompatible/incongruent values and excludes instances 
of different but compatible/congruent values. 
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Insert Figure 3 here 
 
 297 
Formally, the FCD conceptual framework is proposed as an integrated theoretical framework 298 
that could serve to guide systematic cognitive dissonance research in the food and nutrition 299 
domain, particularly with regards to investigating cognitive dissonance effects on food-300 
related attitudes. In acknowledgement of the basic course through which cognitive dissonance 301 
progresses, the FCD framework focuses on the cognitive dissonance arousal process 302 
predicated on the logic that its understanding would facilitate a better gauge of the cognitive 303 
dissonance resolution process that follows, which includes attitude change. In this regard, 304 
through proper application of cognitive dissonance paradigm(s), the FCD framework 305 
stipulates that food-related cognitive discrepancy in food-related attitude(s) would lead to a 306 
psychological state of tension or discomfort, i.e., food-related dissonance. The latter serves as 307 
an aversive motivational state that would then set in motion efforts to reduce the food-related 308 
cognitive discrepancy to restore cognitive consistency. Within the FCD framework, 309 
recognition is given to the fact that food-related cognitive dissonance may occur within 310 
and/or across food-related attitudinal structures. Any cognitive discrepancy amongst the 311 
evaluative tri-components within the internal structure of a food-related attitude is termed 312 
intra-attitudinal, food-related cognitive discrepancy (Intra-FCDp). The aversive state of 313 
tension or psychological discomfort that results from Intra-FCDp is correspondingly intra-314 
attitudinal, food-related dissonance (Intra-FD). These two terms collectively define intra-315 
attitudinal, food-related cognitive dissonance (Intra-FCD). Any cognitive discrepancy that 316 
occurs in the external linkages between food-related attitudes of different attitude objects is 317 
termed inter-attitudinal, food-related cognitive discrepancy (Inter-FCDp). The aversive state 318 
of tension or psychological discomfort that results from Inter-FCDp is correspondingly inter-319 
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attitudinal, food-related dissonance (Inter-FD). These two terms collectively define inter-320 
attitudinal, food-related cognitive dissonance (Inter-FCD). 321 
 Based on the illustration of the FCD framework presented in Figure 3, some 322 
hypotheses may be drawn about the framework mechanism concerning the direction and 323 
mobility of cognitive dissonance effects within and across attitude structures. Within an 324 
extended intra-attitudinal structure, a change in attitude towards an attitude object may occur 325 
due to dissonance-based alterations in (a) the tri-componential bases of the attitude (bottom-326 
up) or (b) the value from which the attitude derives (top-down). The overall change in the 327 
intra-attitudinal structure of that attitude could likely then cause inter-attitudinal cognitive 328 
dissonance to emerge in terms of its external attitudinal link with another (related) attitude 329 
object (assuming consistency between the attitudinal structures of both attitude objects prior 330 
to the former’s intra-attitudinal structure change). If these are strong enough, corresponding 331 
cognitive dissonance effects will bear on the intra-attitudinal structure of the second related 332 
attitude object to ultimately change it and bring it in line with the altered intra-attitudinal 333 
structure of the first attitude object, ceteris paribus. The hypothesis that a change in attitude 334 
towards an attitude object would correspondingly influence a change in attitude towards 335 
another related attitude object has been (1) supported by research on inter-attitudinal structure 336 
and attitude change, which showed the spreading activation effect to apply across various 337 
attitude object level pairings (i.e., superordinate-superordinate, superordinate-subordinate, 338 
subordinate-superordinate, subordinate-subordinate), regardless of the initial attitude object 339 
level from which the attitude change began (Dinauer & Fink, 2005), and (2) suggested by 340 
specific food research examining associations between food-related attitudes such as 341 
Bergmann, von der Heidt and Maller’s (2010) study, which advocated influencing meat 342 
consumption via leveraging on consumers’ ethical concerns about the impact of factory 343 
farming on the environment, including animal welfare. However, the hypothesized cognitive 344 
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dissonance mechanism underlying such attitude alterations amongst linked attitude objects, as 345 
postulated in the FCD framework, are yet to be empirically tested. Additionally, whilst the 346 
basis of the on-going discussion is predicated on intra- and inter-attitudinal cognitive 347 
dissonance occurring sequentially in that order, it is theoretically possible for the sequence to 348 
occur in reverse order, or for the interaction to occur simultaneously. The actual effects of 349 
these latter two theoretical possibilities would likewise require empirical testing. It is, 350 
however, suspected that the effects might be lesser if the sequence is reversed but strongest 351 
when both types of attitudinal cognitive dissonance are activated simultaneously (particularly 352 
if both of these complement each other and work in unison to drive linked attitudes in the 353 
same direction). 354 
Use of the FCD framework for food and nutrition research 355 
The FCD framework may be generally used in any food and nutrition study that is 356 
interested in understanding how cognitive dissonance can influence food-related attitudes, 357 
whether positively or negatively. The ultimate goal is to harness that understanding to guide 358 
and inform efforts in influencing positive dietary attitudes and behaviours. In this regard, the 359 
framework provides an alternative, unique and novel perspective in studying the effects of 360 
food-related cognitive dissonance on food-related attitudes via the latter’s structural pathways 361 
and/or properties. Some considerations in the use of the FCD framework are discussed 362 
herewith.  363 
1. Cognitive dissonance arousal – triggering it and measuring it 364 
As discussed, the cognitive dissonance process entails cognitive dissonance arousal 365 
and cognitive dissonance resolution. For food-related research that are interested in 366 
examining cognitive dissonance as a focal construct, with regards to cognitive dissonance 367 
arousal, it is important to pay careful attention to (1) referencing established protocols in the 368 
arousal of cognitive dissonance (i.e., cognitive paradigms), and (2) ensuring that the actual 369 
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cognitive dissonance aroused thereafter is formally and explicitly assessed. Whilst 370 
mainstream cognitive dissonance research has generally been adept at the former, with a few 371 
having attempted the latter, cognitive dissonance research in the food-related domain have 372 
been relatively inadequate in both (Ong et al., in press). 373 
In focusing and elaborating on the arousal portion of the cognitive dissonance process, 374 
the proposed FCD framework not only serves to distinguish the use of cognitive dissonance 375 
paradigms to arouse cognitive dissonance (i.e., cognitive paradigms) from the explicit 376 
measurement of actual cognitive dissonance aroused itself, but it also particularly provides a 377 
blueprint for the latter in terms of what should be assessed. Indeed, assessing both intra- and 378 
inter-attitudinal cognitive dissonance, along with the sub-components of cognitive 379 
discrepancy and dissonance within each, allows for potential interaction effects between the 380 
two to be explored and discovered. For example, at a superordinate attitude object level, by 381 
reminding an individual that he/she has not been eating healthily despite his/her belief in 382 
doing so (Intra-FCD) and highlighting that he/she has compromised health for something less 383 
consequential such as convenience (Inter-FCD; e.g., Connors et al., 2001; Dave, An, Jeffery, 384 
& Ahluwalia, 2009; Sijtsema, Jesionkowska, Symoneaux, Konopacka & Snoek, 2012), we 385 
could examine if the intra- and inter-attitudinal dimensions of food-related cognitive 386 
dissonance would work in unison to direct change towards health and away from 387 
convenience. The potential of cumulative benefits would be tested in this instance. Intra- and 388 
inter-attitudinal cognitive discrepancies can also realistically occur in opposite directions 389 
simultaneously. For example, at a subordinate attitude objective level, individuals who place 390 
a premium on taste but nonetheless opt for a less tasty food choice based on its health 391 
benefits (Inter-FCD), only to be told subsequently that the food is not as healthy as they had 392 
been led to believe (Intra-FCD; e.g., Goldberg & Sliwa, 2011; Patterson, Satia, Kristal, 393 
Neuhouser & Drewnowski, 2001). Determining which attitude is least resistant to change 394 
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under such circumstances, and hence, the net result(s) of opposing structural food-related 395 
cognitive dissonance, have important implications, particularly for the design and 396 
implementation of effective dietary attitude change interventions (e.g., food and/or food-397 
related health/nutrition communication). Hitherto attempts at direct measurement of cognitive 398 
dissonance (or a proxy thereof) have largely been in terms of self-rating reports (e.g., 399 
Festinger, 1957; Elliot & Devine, 1994; Sweeney et al., 2000; Rothgerber, 2014; Onwezen & 400 
van der Weele, 2016) although a neural mode of assessment has recently been suggested 401 
(Izuma, Matsumoto, Murayama, Samejima, Sadato & Matsumoto, 2010); both of these 402 
present possible direct means of measuring the novel cognitive dissonance constructs within 403 
the FCD framework. 404 
Additionally, it should be noted that the differential application of distinct cognitive 405 
dissonance paradigms (see Table 1) could have different consequences, ceteris paribus.  406 
 407 
  
Insert Table 1 here 
 
 
 408 
Although almost all of the food-related studies reviewed by Ong et al. (in press) did not 409 
explicitly cite the specific cognitive dissonance paradigm(s) used in their manipulation of 410 
cognitive dissonance arousal6, some semblance of what these might be could be inferred from, 411 
and for, at least some of the studies. In food-related consumer behaviour research, cognitive 412 
dissonance appeared to be almost always aroused via the belief disconfirmation paradigm, 413 
particularly in expectancy-disconfirmation studies (e.g., Behrens, Villanueva, & da Silva, 414 
2007; Schifferstein, Kole & Mojet, 1999) where individuals had been generally shown to 415 
react to discrepant food or food-related (characteristics) information by assimilating these 416 
into prior knowledge as a means of dissonance resolution. Albarracín et al. (2003) seemed to 417 
                                                          
6 With the exception of Cao et al. (2014) – see Ong et al. (in press) for details. 
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have used the induced compliance paradigm in nutrition communication to a somewhat 418 
similar effect. Specifically, participants in the study who were exposed to an abstinence 419 
message regarding an alcohol-like beverage, expressed higher intentions to use the product 420 
after consuming the drink compared to those who were exposed to a moderate-use message. 421 
In contrast, Stellefson et al. (2006) used the hypocrisy paradigm to highlight the discrepancy 422 
between individuals’ statements about the importance of physical exercise and good dietary 423 
habits to maintaining physical health or appearance, and knowledge of their actual health 424 
behaviours in these two areas (amongst other variables); however, they found no cognitive 425 
dissonance effects on influencing intentions to engage in either health behaviours. In all these 426 
studies, the arousal of cognitive dissonance occurred intra-attitudinally. Of the 14 food-427 
related studies reviewed by Ong et al. (in press), inter-attitudinal cognitive dissonance arousal 428 
was clearly evident primarily in a meat consumption study by Rothgerber (2014) who found a 429 
tendency amongst meat eaters to sustain their meat consumption behaviour through selective 430 
cognitive modification after being exposed to vignettes depicting various types of vegetarians. 431 
The method of cognitive dissonance arousal was, however, indiscernible within the 432 
parameters of any of the established cognitive dissonance paradigms, coming marginally 433 
close only to an atypical version of belief disconfirmation at best.  434 
Given thus, it would be instructive to systematically explore the application of the 435 
various cognitive dissonance paradigms in terms of their precise effects on the arousal of 436 
food-related cognitive dissonance, particularly in relation to the latter’s distinct structural 437 
dimensions as proposed in the FCD framework. A systematic study as such, along with 438 
noting the precise circumstances under which food-related cognitive dissonance emerge, 439 
might possibly facilitate efforts to appropriately match paradigms to intra- and/or inter-440 
attitudinal dimensions of food-related cognitive dissonance to attain optimal food-related 441 
attitude change outcomes. For example, even though Albarracín et al.’s (2003) study implies 442 
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that the induced compliance paradigm would lead to the maintenance of an existing negative 443 
dietary behaviour, the same paradigm has been used as the premise of a clinical, dissonance-444 
based intervention to help individuals with body-image concerns keep potential dysfunctional 445 
eating at bay (e.g., Stice, Mazotti, Weibel & Agras, 2000; Stice, Rohde, Durant & Shaw, 446 
2012). This example serves to reiterate the fact that careful thought must be given to how 447 
cognitive dissonance is created or aroused, as this might influence the mode of dissonance 448 
resolution undertaken subsequently. 449 
2. Attitude strength 450 
It is important to identify and select attitudes that are powerful drivers of behaviours 451 
and cognition rather than those that are “minimally consequential” (Bizer & Krosnick, 2001, 452 
p. 566). The former are, however, often strong attitudes that are hard to change, while the 453 
latter are often weak attitudes that are relatively easy to change. This is what has come to be 454 
known as attitude strength which, in its multi-dimensional form, is determined by the 455 
dimensions of extremity, intensity, certainty, importance, knowledge, accessibility, direct 456 
experience, latitudes of rejection and non-commitment, and evaluative-cognitive consistency 457 
(Krosnick & Smith, 1994); in its simpler, (higher order) bi-dimensional form, it is determined 458 
by the dimensions of centrality and commitment (Holland, 2003; Pomerantz, Chaiken & 459 
Tordesillas, 1995). 460 
Attitude accessibility, one of the dimensions underlying attitude strength, is an intra-461 
attitudinal structure property that denotes the strength of association between attitude object 462 
and its attitudinal evaluation (Fabrigar et al. 2005). Highly accessible attitudes are usually 463 
those that have been used or activated frequently, such that “repeated expressions strengthen 464 
the associations between objects and evaluations, thereby increasing the ease of retrieval of 465 
the evaluation from memory” (Fabrigar et al., 2005, p. 81, citing Fazio, Chen, McDonel & 466 
Sherman, 1982, and Powell & Fazio, 1984). Highly accessible attitudes typically, therefore, 467 
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engender fast responses to situations that appropriately elicit them, and have been found to be 468 
relatively stable over time, and good predictors of behaviour (Schwarz, 2001, citing Fazio, 469 
1995). Such fast computational responses occur particularly when all information that comes 470 
to mind is evaluatively consistent (Schwarz & Bohner 2001). Given thus, assuming that an 471 
individual has a positive and highly accessible attitude towards consuming fried chicken 472 
nuggets, then hypothetically, an appropriately created and channelled intra-attitudinal 473 
cognitive discrepancy could be used to disrupt attitude accessibility through the generation of 474 
evaluative inconsistency, which in turn, would slow the computational responses (Schwarz & 475 
Bohner, 2001) for a more deliberated evaluation (Fabrigar et al., 2005). The subsequent intra-476 
attitudinal dissonance aroused may impact on the latter in terms of driving it in a healthier 477 
direction. Such a hypothesis about the underlying cognitive dissonance mechanism may be 478 
derived from the FCD framework for empirical testing. 479 
Given that attitude represents an overall evaluative summary of information deriving 480 
from affective, behavioural and cognitive bases, attitudes have also been postulated to be 481 
acutely accessible when based on information considered as highly diagnostic (i.e., credible 482 
evaluative information) by an individual. These commonly include classes of information 483 
from across the three bases, such as sensory information about the object, emotional reactions 484 
engendered by the object, past behaviour towards the object, and direct experience with the 485 
object (Fabrigar et al., 2005; Fazio, 1995). According to researchers (e.g., Fabrigar et al., 486 
2005), some attitudes may be primarily affective-based (i.e., attitude formed mainly from 487 
emotional experiences with, or responses to, an attitude object), some primarily behavioural-488 
based (i.e., attitude formed mainly from behavioural experiences with, or responses to, an 489 
attitude object) and some primarily cognitive-based (i.e., attitude formed mainly from 490 
cognitive experiences with, or responses to, an attitude object). When intra-attitudinal 491 
cognitive discrepancy occurs due to cognitive inconsistency between at least two 492 
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componential bases (e.g., affective-cognitive – liking junk food despite knowing its unhealthy 493 
properties), in which one is the primary basis for the attitude (e.g., affect), cognitive 494 
discrepancy reduction in response to intra-attitudinal dissonance might possibly occur 495 
through changing one or both of the other two secondary bases (e.g., cognition and/or 496 
behaviour) to be in line with the primary base, owing to the cognitive dissonance resolution 497 
principle of effecting change via the route of least resistance. The challenge then is to see 498 
how cognitive dissonance may be manoeuvred using the FCD framework to target and 499 
change the more resistant, negative (and affective-based in the on-going example) food-500 
related attitudes. 501 
Whilst attitude accessibility is an intra-attitudinal structure property, recent research 502 
has begun to examine the impact of attitude accessibility across attitude structures (i.e., inter-503 
attitudinal effects of attitude accessibility on two different (but related) attitude objects). It 504 
has generally been found that increasing the accessibility of one attitude leads to greater 505 
strength and resistance of the related attitude to counter-attitudinal responses in a consistent 506 
direction, ceteris paribus (Blankenship, Wegener & Murray, 2015). This makes the 507 
introduction of the FCD framework timely as it allows for analysis of how intra- and inter-508 
attitudinal cognitive dissonance might be utilized to overcome strong, negative food-related 509 
attitudes linked to one another.  510 
Finally, it is important to note that attitude strength generally follows the life stages 511 
hypothesis, such that susceptibility to change is highest in the early and late part of an 512 
individual’s life, which Visser and Krosnick (1998) attributed to factors such as role 513 
transitions, changes over time in the meaning linked to particular attitude objects, etc. Thus, 514 
an additional challenge for a dissonance-based strategy of attitude change is to effect 515 
alteration of unhealthy food attitudes held by individuals in the middle stage of their lives 516 
(i.e., young to middle adulthood) when attitude strength is strongest. 517 
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3. Explicit vs. implicit attitude 518 
Amongst the many typologies of attitude that researchers have considered in the study 519 
of the concept, one that has gained increased, though, comparatively limited, traction in food-520 
related research pertains to the explicit-implicit classification (e.g., Czyzewska, Graham & 521 
Ceballos, 2011; Panzone, Hilton, Sale & Cohen, in press). Typically, explicit attitudes have 522 
been referred to as evaluations that may be consciously expressed, controlled and thus, 523 
directly measureable, and implicit attitudes as evaluations “for which people may not initially 524 
have conscious access and for which activation cannot be controlled” (Rydell, McConnell & 525 
Mackie, 2008, p. 1526), and thus, only indirectly measurable. With the use of consciousness 526 
as distinguishing criterion being in contention (Gawronski, Hofmann & Wilbur 2006), an 527 
alternative take on the explicit-implicit distinction, which focuses on underlying principles of 528 
information processing, has been suggested. In this instance, explicit attitudes may be seen as 529 
declarative, propositional evaluations, which entail deliberate, evaluative judgements on 530 
assertions about evaluative properties of specific attitude objects, particularly in terms of 531 
truth values (i.e., as being true or false). Implicit attitudes, on the other hand, may be seen as 532 
associative evaluations, which entail spontaneous (with little cognitive resources expended), 533 
affective reactions to specific attitude objects, independent of the assignment of truth values 534 
(Gawronski & Strack, 2004; Gawronski et al., 2006). 535 
Hence, as the cognitive dissonance arousal and resolution processes are inherently 536 
propositional, only explicit, but not implicit, attitudes would be subjected to cognitive 537 
dissonance effects, including dissonance-based attitude changes, if any (Gawronski & Strack, 538 
2004). Correspondingly, the current proposed FCD framework applies only to explicit 539 
attitudinal judgements (i.e., explicit attitudes), but not for implicit evaluative associations (i.e., 540 
implicit attitudes). Nonetheless, researchers have studied the idea of implicit ambivalence, 541 
which is described as the discrepancy between implicit and explicit evaluations of the same 542 
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object (Gawronski & Strack, 2012), and found dissonance to result from such a discrepancy. 543 
The resultant dissonance induced greater cognitive processing of attitude object relevant 544 
information (Rydell et al., 2008) apparently as an explicit discrepancy reduction strategy. 545 
How this phenomenon works its way into the current proposed FCD framework remains a 546 
work-in-progress, particularly since there is ambiguity surrounding the notion of ambivalence. 547 
Typically, attitudinal ambivalence is said to have occurred “when there is evaluative tension 548 
associated with one’s attitude because the summary includes both positive and negative 549 
evaluations” (Fabrigar et al., 2005, p. 84, citing Kaplan, 1972, Scott, 1969, and Thompson, 550 
Zanna & Griffin, 1995). Explicit attitude forms the base of such a typical definition of 551 
attitudinal ambivalence, which has also been referred to as explicit ambivalence (Gawronski 552 
& Strack, 2012), and noted to be an intra-attitudinal phenomenon (Fabrigar et al., 2005). The 553 
involvement of implicit and explicit attitudes in implicit ambivalence, however, seem to 554 
suggest that this latter ambivalence is inter-attitudinal in nature, as akin to the notion of dual 555 
attitude structures (Wilson, Lindsey & Schooler, 2000). 556 
Future Directions and Conclusion 557 
The proposed FCD conceptual framework presented in this paper represents an initial 558 
basic step towards facilitating a systematic approach to the study of cognitive dissonance in 559 
food and nutrition, particularly in terms of how food-related cognitive dissonance might 560 
impact on food-related attitudes. It specifically focuses on understanding the dissonance 561 
arousal process, which has hitherto been inadequately studied (Ong et al., in press), in order 562 
to facilitate an understanding of the subsequent dissonance resolution process that includes 563 
attitude change. Through integrating insights from the literature on cognitive dissonance and 564 
attitude, in the context of food and nutrition, the FCD framework presents a novel, structural 565 
perspective of food-related cognitive dissonance that would, hopefully, contribute to, and 566 
enhance, both of these understandings. With a view to eventually utilize the proposed FCD 567 
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conceptual framework to guide the development of dissonance-based strategies to influence 568 
positive dietary attitudes (and thus behaviours), future research work in this area should focus 569 
on testing, and fine-tuning, some of the basic assumptions and features of the proposed 570 
framework, as discussed here. As the FCD framework focuses on the arousal portion of the 571 
cognitive dissonance process, deriving the resolution portion of the process based on the 572 
basics of the framework could be part of such efforts to complete and close the loop. 573 
Ultimately, the establishment of a systematic explanation of cognitive dissonance effects in 574 
food-related attitudes would, in turn, improve the construct’s application precision in 575 
changing dietary patterns towards health and aid in the development of effective nutrition 576 
programmes in public health promotion. 577 
578 
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